I construct an intertemporal searching model ("take it or leave it o¤er") in a frictional directorship market to explain the unbalanced matching between the director and the …rm. In this model, potential candidates for outside directors and …rms have heterogenous (also, well ordered) quality levels. Also, both parties have strictly ordered preferences over the quality of counterpart from high levels to low levels. A candidate considers his quality ranking to compare the value of accepting a favorite o¤er at present to the value of waiting for successuful matching with a better o¤er in the future. My model suggests that that highly quali…ed candidates would be likely to be matched with bad (not too bad) …rms. The best candidate could go to the 150th ranked …rm over 250 …rms under the uniform distribution for the quality of the …rm, and the 140th ranked …rm under the extreme value distribution.
1 Introduction Gabaix and Landier (2006) propose a simple competitive assignment model to explain CEO compensation. They assume that CEOs have heterogenous talent level and are assigned to …rms competitively. The managerial impact of a CEO's talent increase with the value of the …rm under his control. Under these assumptions, they …nd that the best CEO goes to the largest …rms and a CEO's pay increases in the size of …rm and size of average …rm in the economy. Their empirical …nding supports these predictions.
However, we can easily …nd the mismatch between the director and the …rm in the directorship market. I analyze 250 U.S …rm's board pro…le among Fortune 500 …rms in 2005. Then, I rank all ongoing and retired CEOs who are working as outside directors on the boards based on the size of …rms (market capitalization) at which they are working or worked as CEO. The data shows that, for instance, the …rst ranked director is matched with 176th ranked …rm, and the 6 th ranked director is matched with 246th ranked …rm in terms of the market capitalization in 2005.
To explain the unbalanced match, I construct an intertemporal searching and matching model ("take it or leave it o¤er") in a frictional directorship market under four main assumptions. First, the candidates for outside directors want to maximize their reputation value which depends on the size of the …rm. Second, there is no wage competition or wage bargaining in a director market. It naturally follows that the …rms simply prefer highly quali…ed directors. Third, outside director positions are randomly opened over the time frame. Finally, potential candidates for outside directors and …rms have heterogenous (also, well ordered) quality levels. Also, both parties have strictly ordered preferences over the quality of counterpart from high levels to low levels. A candidate considers his quality ranking to compare the value of accepting a favorite o¤er at present to the value of waiting for successuful matching with a better o¤er in the future.
Under a certain assumption, there is the possibility that highly quali…ed candidates are matched with bad (not too bad) …rms. The best candidate would be likely to go to the 150th ranked …rm over 250 …rms under the uniform distribution and go to 140th ranked …rms under Gabaix and Landier (2006) 's extreme value distribution. Additionally, I …nd that the higher ranked (better talented) candidates have higher cuto¤ ranking of …rms but the marginal increase in the ranking of …rm is diminishing. For instance, if the …rm quality follows an uniform distribution, (if candidates consider the ranking of …rm, e.g, Fortune 500, as the quality of …rm), the di¤erence between the cuto¤ level of 1st ranked candidate and 20th ranked one is 10 in terms of …rm ranking, but the di¤erence between 20th ranked candidate and 30 ranked one is 64. If the …rm quality follows the distribution of CEO talent infered by Gabaix and Landier (2006) based on the extreme value theory (if candidates consider the talent level of CEO as the quality of …rm), the gap between 1st ranked and 20th ranked candidate is also 10 and between 20th and 30th is 68.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I provide a brief review of the related literature. In section 3, I develop an intertemporal searching and matching model. The Section 4 show the numerical analysis. I summarize concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 Related literature 2.1 The matching/searching and matching Gale and Shapley (1962) study the classic matching problem in the marriage market.
They assume that each part (man and woman) ranks couterparts based on idyosyncratic preferences and show that there always exists a stable assignment equilibrium (assortative matching). In contrast, this paper assumes that both parties have the same preference order. They simply prefer high quality to low quality. McCall (1970) develops the intertemporal searching and matching model in the labor market. He sets up the model of representative agent who lives forever and uses sequential search technique to explain the determination of reservation wage. I also analyze the determination of reservation quality level based on the intertemporal searching and matching framework, but both parties in the matching market are heterogenous and well-ranked in terms of quality. Gabaix and Landier (2006) propose a simple competitive assignment model to explain CEO compensation. They assume that CEOs have heterogenous talent level and are assigned to …rms competitively. The managerial impact of a CEO's talent increase with the value of the …rm under his control. Under these assumptions, they …nd that the best CEO goes to the largest …rms and a CEO's pay increases in the size of …rm and size of average …rm in the economy. Their empirical …nding supports these predictions. In this paper, I study the matching problem in a frictional director market. The vacancies for the outside directors are assumed to be randomly opened over time.
Model
I develop an intertemporal searching and matching model in which potential candidates for outside directorships live forever and are risk neutral. Based on Gale and Shapley (1962), McCall (1970) and Gabaix and Landier (2006) I construct the basic setting.
There are m number of potential candidates for outside directorships with an well-ordered quality level, q k new : k denotes the ranking of his quality level in the pool of potential candidates. There is no possibility that q i new = q j new when i 6 = j: I assume that the number of potential candidates, m, is time-invariant on the steady-state, which means that the in ‡ow into the potential candidates pool is equal to the out ‡ow from the potential candidates pool. I also assume that each potential candidate's ranking of his quality is time-invariant on the steady state.
At each time, the n number of …rms each creates one vacancy for an outside director position. The n number of vacancies for an outside director position are randomly created in a sense that the quality of …rms, q f 1 ; is randomly drawn from a nondecreasing 1 We can interprete the quality of …rm in three di¤erent ways: (1) the ranking of …rm in the economy, and continuous distribution F (q f ) on [0, q f ]: Also, F (0) = 0 and F (q f ) = 1:The distribution of quality of …rms is well dispersed, so that there is no possibility for q i f = q j f when i 6 = j: i and j denote the ranking of quality level of …rm. f ::: The stage is for the following. At …rst, all …rms o¤er to a favorite one (the …rst ranked candidate). The …rst ranked candidate rejects all but his favorite one and decide whether to accept this favorite o¤er or also reject this to allow for the possibility that the better o¤er may come along later. In the second stage, those …rms who are rejected give o¤er to their second choice. The second ranked candidate iterates this process. If m n all potential candidates will eventually have received an o¤er and made decisions.
If m > n only the …rst n number of potential candidates will surely have received an o¤er and made decisions 2 : I will below focus on the steady state equilibrium in the latter case 3 .
The value function
If a candidate with the quality ranking, k; has an favorite o¤er in the …rst n number of job openning is q k;f , then he will make a decision whether to accept or wait for a better o¤er in the future. Neither quitting nor …ring is allowed. At each period, a candidate chooses a strategy to maximize E P 1 t=0 ( 1 1+r ) t y t ; where y t is the reputation value from working as outside director depending on q k;f . The bellman equation for the candidate's problem is
where V (q k;f ) denotes the value of having an o¤er, q k;f ; in hand and V a (q k;f ) denotes the value of accepting a current o¤er. q 0 k;f is the o¤er in the next period. Then, the solution will be
(2) the quality of CEO, and (3) the size of …rm. The functional form of distribution F (q f ); depends on interpretations.
2 Suppose there are n number of job openings and n + 1 number of potential candidates. Then, the n + 1 th ranked candidate will get an o¤er only if at least one of higher ranked candidates than him will reject an favorite o¤er. In general, we can not guarantee that all potential candidates will have received an o¤er. 3 The reasons are that (1) this model can generally guarantee that the …rst n number of upper ranked candidates will surely have received an o¤er and made decisions and (2) I want to focus on the cuto¤ level of highly ranked candidates in the pool of potential candidates.
where q cut k;f is the cuto¤ quality with the porperty that a candidate should accept an o¤er q k;f q cut k;f and reject an o¤er q k;f q cut k;f . More speci…cally, the value function of accepting this o¤er is given by
The ‡ow value for a candidate who will serve as an outside director on boards with quality level, q k;f ; denoted by V a (q k;f ) equals the sum of the ‡ow return, the reputation value from working as outside director, y(q k;f ); plus the discounted expected ‡ow value de…ned by 1 1+ V a (q k;f ): We can rewrite above equation by
where the reputation function, y(q k;f ); is increasing in q k;f and y(0) = 0: The value from rejection is de…ned by
The value for a candidate of quality ranking, k; who waits for better o¤er is denoted by V r (k) which equals the return from waiting and drawing again. Here, the expectation operation (E) is with respect to two components. One is the probability of successful matching with a better position, prob k ; and the other is the value of q 0 k;f : In this model, all candidates have a well-ordered quality ranking and "take or leave it process" at each period mainly depends on their ranking, so that prob k plays a crucial role in determining the policy. More speci…cally, the value of rejection is given by
where the expectaion is only with respect to the value of q 0 k;f : The value for a candidate of quality ranking, k; who waits for better o¤er is denoted by V r (k) equals the discounted expected value from getting a better o¤er, q 0 k;f q cut k;f ; in the future, which is de…ned by
and the discounted expected value from rejection, denoted by
q cut k;f ) denotes the probability that the kth ranked candidate may get a better o¤er, q 0 k;f q cut k;f ; in the next period: In other words, prob k (q 0 k;f q cut k;f ) represents the probability of successful matching with a better position than his cuto¤ quality. The probability function has the following property.
We can rewirite the equation (2) by
Finally, we can get
3.2 The cuto¤ quality, q
The solution will be
Henceforth, the endogenous cuto¤ quality level, denoted by q cut k;f satis…es the following condition.
Rewritting above equation, we can get
The left-hand side is the cost of searching one more time when he got an o¤er, q cut k;f and the right-hand side is the expected bene…t of searching one more time. The equation (3) makes the candidate to set q cut k;f to equate the cost and bene…t of searching one more time.
Proposition 1 Let me de…ne the right hand side of equation (3) as
, there exists an unique cuto¤ level, q cut k;f ; 0 < q cut k;f < q f ; which guarantees that the kth ranked candidate accept an o¤ er, q k;f ; if q k;f q cut k;f : Otherwise, he waits for a better o¤ er in the future
Proof. See Appendix
First, I focus on the cuto¤ level of the 1st ranked candidate, q cut 1;f : If at least one job opening out of n number of job openings is drawn from the sapce above q cut 1;f the 1st ranked candidate gets a better o¤er. The probability that the 1st ranked candidate can get a better o¤er, q cut 1;f < q
The corresponding expected value of better o¤er is
Henceforth, his cuto¤ level, q cut 1;f ; solves to
Then, we can have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The probability of successful matching with a better position than q cut 1;f ; prob 1 (q cut 1;f ); decreases in q cut 1;f and there exists an unique cuto¤ level, q cut 1;f ; which guarantees that the 1st ranked candidate accepts an o¤ er, q 1;f ; if q 1;f q cut 1;f : Otherwise, he waits for a better o¤ er in the future.
Similarly, the probability that a 2nd ranked candidate can get a better o¤er, q cut 2;f < q high 2;f < q f ; is
Suppose that his cuto¤ level is below the cuto¤ level of the 1st ranked candidate. If only one job opening is drawn from the space between q cut 2;f and q cut 1;f he gets this o¤er because the 1 st ranked candidate will reject this one.
;f ) n 1 shows this probability. In this case, the expected value of better o¤er is given by
It is clear that if at least two job openings are drawn above q cut 2;f ; he will get a better o¤er. The corresponding expected value of high o¤er is
Therefore, his cuto¤ level, q cut 2;f ; also solves to
The proposition follows.
Proposition 3 The probability of successful matching with a better position than q cut 2;f ; prob 2 (q cut 2;f ); decreases in q cut 2;f and there exists an unique cuto¤ level, q cut 2;f ; which guarantees that the 2nd ranked candidate accepts an o¤ er, q 2;f ; if q 2;f q cut 2;f : Otherwise, he waits for a better o¤ er in the future.
Proof. Omitted.
The probability of successful matching
I, below, generalize the probability function 4 that the kth ranked candidate (3 k n) 5
can get a better o¤er, q high k;f > q cut k;f : I, …rst, consider the case that a favorite o¤er, q cut k;f ; is less than M in[q cut j;f ]; where M in[q cut j;f ] is the minimum cuto¤ level of higher ranked candidates than kth ranked candidate , j = 1; 2; :::::k 1: If all candidates with higher ranking than k have an unique cuto¤ level, then the probability that a kth ranked candidate can get a better o¤er, q high k;f > q cut k;f is de…ned by
where
where z = 2; :::; k 1
is the minimum cuto¤ level, j = 1; 2; :::::k 1 and z th M in[q cut j;f ] is the z th minimum cuto¤ level among q cut j;f , j = 1; 2; :::::k 1: For the simplicity, let 0 th M in[q cut j;f ] = q cut k;f : Even though less than k job openings are drawn from the space above q cut k;f ; there is the possibility that he will get a better o¤er in the future.
show the probability that these cases would occur. For instance, if only one job is drawn from the space between q cut k;f and M in[q cut j;f ] and other n 1 job are drawn from the space below q cut k;f ; the k th ranked candidate will get a better o¤er in the future because all higher ranked candidates than the k th ranked one will reject this o¤er.
Suppose only two jobs are drawn from the space between M in[q cut j;f ] and 2 nd M in[q cut j;f ] and other n 2 job are drawn from the space below q cut k;f . Then, he can also get a better o¤er because all higher ranked candidates except the candidate who has M in[q cut j;f ] quality level will reject these o¤ers. There are many di¤erent cases which guarantee that the k th ranked candidate will get a better o¤er in the future even though less than k job openings 4 You can see more details in Appendix. 5 As I mentioned before, I will focus on the cuto¤ level of the …rst n number of candidates in the pool of potential candidates because we can generally guarantee that the …rst n number of candidates will surely have received an o¤er in this model. are drawn from the space above q cut k;f . More explanations are given in the appendix. It is straightforward that if at least k jobs are drawn from the space above q cut k;f ; the k th ranked candidate gets a better o¤er. G k D (q cut k;f ) shows the probability that this case would occur. Now, I will show more explicit form of the expected ‡ow value of getting a better o¤er,
in Equation (2) by
where By similar methods, the probability 6 that a kth ranked candidate (k 3) can get a better o¤er, q high k;f > q cut k;f ; is de…ned by
when (z 2) th M in[q cut j;f ] q cut k;f < (z 1) th M in[q cut j;f ]; z = 3; :::::k 1
Notice that when k = 3; we do not have to take into account the …rst range ((z
Only two job openings are drawn from the space between q cut k;f and 2 nd M in[q cut j;f ] and other n 2 jobs are drawn from space below q cut k;f : Then, he will get a better o¤er because all higher ranked candidates except the candidate who has M in[q cut j;f ] will reject these o¤ers. We can generalize these cases in the following manner. Even though less than k job openings are drawn from the space above q cut k;f the kth ranked candidate (k 3) can get a better o¤er when at least two job are drawn from the space between q cut k;f and 2 nd M in[q cut j;f ]: G k F (q cut k;f ) and G k G (q cut k;f ) show the probability of these cases. It is clear that at least k number of job opening are drawn from the space above q cut k;f then he will get a better o¤er. G k H (q cut k;f ) provides the probability function of this case. Similarly, we can …nd more explicit form of the expected ‡ow value of getting a better o¤er, prob k (q cut k;f )EV a (q high k;f ); (k 3) in Equation (2) by
when (z 1) th M in[q cut j;f ] q cut k;f < (z 2) th M in[q cut j;f ]; z = 3; :::::k 1
4 Numerical Analysis
The quality of …rm: RANKING
I proposes a numerical analysis and calibration of the model. Table 1 shows the baseline parameter and functional form.
Table 1
I assume that the reputational value function, y(q k;f ); is linear in the quality of …rm and the distribution of …rms'quality, F (q k;f ); follows an uniform distribution on [0, 1]: Here, we can interprete the quality of …rm as the ranking of …rm or quantile of ranking in the economy. The results of the simulations are shown in Table 2 and Figure 1 . Table 2 =F igure 1 Table 2 shows the cuto¤ …rm quality level of candidates for outside directors by the ranking based on the baseline parameter and functional forms. The cuto¤ value of the …rst ranked candidate is 0.4. We can interpret this value as the quantile of …rm ranking in the economy. If we assume that there are 250 …rms in the economy, this value implies the 150th ranked …rm. The notable feature is that the relatioship between the ranking of candidates and the ranking of …rms is positive and concave. It means that higher ranked (better talented) candidates have the higher cuto¤ ranking of …rms, but the marginal increase in the ranking of …rm is diminishing. For instance, the di¤erence between the cuto¤ level of 1st ranked candidate and 20th ranked one is 10 in terms of …rm ranking, but the di¤erence between 20th ranked candidate and 30 ranked one is 64 in terms of …rm ranking. Given the number of job opening, n; is large enough, the reason is that the gap in the probability of successful matching with the better o¤er in the future among high ranked candidates are arbitrary small in a low range of q k;f ; which makes a small di¤erence in the cuto¤ level, but this gap gets bigger when the ranking becomes lower.
From the viewpoints of high ranked candidates, if the quality of current o¤er is relatively small, they expect that they would get a better o¤er in the future with the probability which is almost close to 1. Figure 2 shows the probability of successful matching in the future by the rank of candidates.
F igure 2 Table 3 -A shows the sensitivity of the cuto¤ level to the change in the discounted factor,. : In a case of the …rst ranked candidate, the cuto¤ …rm ranking level decrease in the discounted factor, but the marginal e¤ect of the discounted factor is diminished. For instance, the increase from = 0:05 to = 0:1 decreases the …rm ranking by 3.25, but the increase from = 0:25 to = 0:3 decreases the …rm ranking by 2.23. The interpretation is clear. As the candidate become less patient, his cuto¤ level decreases. Table 3 -B provides the e¤ect of change in the functional form of reputation value generated by outside directorships on the cuto¤ level of the 1st ranked candidate. When y(q f ) = q 2 f ; the cuto¤ level is the 120 rakned …rm over 250 …rms in the economy, which is compared to the 150 ranked …rm in the linear form, y(q f ) = q f case. Since the marginal reputation value increases in q f under the functional form, y(q f ) = q 2 f ; the highly ranked candidates tend to wait for a better o¤er (better quality) in the future to enjoy it.
T able 3
The quality of …rm: the quality of CEO
Here, I assume that the quality of …rm, F (q f ); follows the distribution of CEO talent infered by Gabaix and Landier (2006) . Their calibration shows that there is an upper bound T max ; in the distribution of talent and in the upper tail, talent density is
It follows that the density, left of the upper bound T max , is I approximate the upper tail distribution of talent F (q f ) by
, where F (0) = 0 and F (q f ) = 1 F igure 3/T able 4 Figure 3 shows the shape of the distribution, f (q f ) and Table 4 
Conclusion
I construct a matching model ("take it or leave it o¤er") in a frictional directorship market to explain the (observed) unbalanced match between the quality of outside directors on boards and the …rms. My calibration shows that if the …rm quality follows an uniform distribution, the best candidate would be likely to go to the 150th ranked …rm over 250 …rms. Also, the best candidate would be likely to be matched with the 140th ranked …rms under Gabaix and Landier (2006) 's extreme value distribution.
Appendix
Proof. of the Proposition 1: By assumption, V a (k; 0) = 0 and V r (k; 0) > 0: Also, V a (k; q f ) > 0 and V r (k; q f ) = 0: Since
0 (by assumption), there exists an unique cuto¤ level.
Proof. of the Proposition 2: (1) prob 1 (q 1;f ) = P n t=1 C n t (1 F (q 1;f )) t F (q 1;f ) n t = 1 F (q 1;f ) n : So,
Then, the proposition 1 is satis…ed, which implies that there exist an unique cuto¤ level.
6.1 The probability that a kth ranked candidate can get a better o¤er, q
Here, I show how to derive the probability that a kth ranked candidate can get a better o¤er, q high k;f q k;f : Let me explain the outline by showing the case of the 5 th ranked candidate.
Case 1: the 5 th ranked candidate: q 5;f < M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ]
1. Suppose his current o¤er, q 5;f ; is less than the minimum cuto¤ level of higher ranked candidates, q 5;f < M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ]: Then, if at least …ve (k) job openings out of n number job openings are drawn from the space above q 5;f ; he will get a better o¤er in the future. The probability in this case is that
where C n t = n t ! C n t represents the distinguishible permutations of n objects, t of one type and n t of another type (binomial coe¢ cient).
2. From here, suppose that less than 5 (k) jobs are drawn from the space above q 5;f : If only four job openings out of n number job openings are drawn form the space between 3 rd M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ] and 4 th M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ] = M ax[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ], he will get a better o¤er because the candidate who has the maximum cuto¤ level will reject all o¤ers. The probability is
3. If three or four job opening are drawn from the space between 2 nd M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ] and 3 rd M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ]; then he also can get a better o¤er with the probability
where C n a;b = n a; b; n a b ! because both candidates who have the maximum cuto¤ level and 3 rd M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ] will reject all o¤ers in the case of …rst two terms in the probability function and one of them will reject all o¤ers in the …nal case. C n a;b represents the distinguishible permutations of n objects, a of one type, b of second type and n a b of third type (multinomial coe¢ cient). 
5. Finally, if one, two, three or four job opening are drawn from the space between q 5;f and M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ] =1 st M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ]; then he also can get a better o¤er with the probability
Case 2: the 5 th ranked candidate: M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ] q 5;f < 2 nd M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ]
1. Suppose his current o¤er, q 5;f ; is M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ] q 5;f < 2 nd M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ] and less than k job openings are drawn from the space above q 5;f : Then, if two, three or four job openings out of n number job openings are drawn from the space between his current o¤er and 2 nd M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ]; he will get a better o¤er.
The probability is that
2. Also, if at least …ve (k) job openings out of n number job openings are drawn from the space above q 5;f ; he will get a better o¤er in the future. The probability is that 1. Also, suppose that less than 5 (k) job openings are drawn from the space above q 5;f : In this case, if three or four job openings out of n number job openings are drawn from the space between his current o¤er and 3 rd M in[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ] he will get a better o¤er with probability
2. Also, if at least …ve (k) job openings out of n number job openings are drawn from the space above q 5;f he will get a better o¤er in the future. The probability is that 
2. Also, if at least …ve (k) job openings out of n number job openings are drawn from the space above q 5;f ; he will get a better o¤er in the future. The probability is that
Case 5: the 5 th ranked candidate: M ax[q cut 1;f ; q cut 2;f ; q cut 3;f ; q cut 4;f ] q 5;f < q f In this case, he will get a better o¤er in the future only if at least …ve (k) job openings out of n number job openings are drawn from the space above q 5;f : It is given by
Overally, the probability that the 5 th ranked candidate can get a better o¤er, q high k;f q k;f ; in the future is 
